Internal Conflicts in Peru
Tuesday, June 20, 2023
The impact left by the terrorism in Perú after its fall
Chuschi the beginning of terror
The attack in Chuschi showed that the use of violence would be the central element of the Shining Path proposal, who had decided to initiate and establish a "new order" through the shedding of the blood of "a million people" and the annihilation of the exploiters and the victory of the exploited.
The burning of ballot boxes and electoral rolls, as well as the theft of political propaganda and weapons, were only the beginning of acts of violence that turned into armed attacks on police stations, such as the one in Vilcashuamán, where local authorities were assassinated and the community was attacked Members of mass crimes and public places with the aim of sowing terror in the population. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) estimates that the number of victims of the entire internal armed conflict is very likely at 69,280.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission determined that more than 90 percent of the victims of the CAI died in eight of the poorest regions of the Andes and the Peruvian Amazon, particularly in Ayacucho and Junin, where the conflict began. It is no coincidence that more than 40 percent of the deaths and disappearances in the country are concentrated in the province of Ayacucho, but at the same time, between 1972 and 1981, it has been confirmed that nearly 50 percent of the total population of the province is illiterate 81 percent of the households do not have basic services such as water and electricity.
It should also be noted that an inherent characteristic of the differential impact of all these forms of violence is ethnic and racial discrimination. Racism and the underestimation of indigenous people, peasants - and the poor - as citizens is a powerful reason why the death of thousands of Quechua-speaking Peruvians went unnoticed by national opinion. In fact, one of the most profound manifestations of this deep-rooted ethnic and racial discrimination in our history is that the 1979 political constitution granted the right to vote to those considered illiterate, while in the 1980 elections, they were given the right to vote for the first time.
It is true that since the end of the internal armed conflict, Peru has been able to strengthen its democratic institutions and create a basis for the promotion and respect of human rights. However, it is also true that social and economic inequality still exists, and that the groups most affected by Light Path's violence remain vulnerable. As with all subsequent events that affected our society in such a violent and bloody manner, the original attack in Chuschi must never be forgotten. Our first obligation today is to remember the violations committed, as we defend the memory of those who fought and resisted, because we can only guarantee that if we citizens are committed to equality and justice and examine our history with a critical eye it is not a duplicate.
Reference:Adminpucp. (2022, 15 enero). Chuschi, hace 40 años, el inicio del terror - IDEHPUCP. IDEHPUCP. https://idehpucp.pucp.edu.pe/analisis1/chuschi-hace-40-anos-el-inicio-del-terror/
Tuesday, June 6, 2023
Capture of Abimael Guzman
Twelve operations
General Marco Miyashiro, one of the men who participated in "Operation Victory," writes in his book Memories of a Policeman (published in 2021) that both the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and SL suffered heavy losses as a result of the 12 "police intelligence operations carried out by the GEIN, which allowed the pacification of Peru to begin."
The first house that Abimael Guzmán Reinoso (1934-2021) had lived in Lima was possible to find thanks to the first of these, the so-called "operation ISA", which was launched on June 1, 1980. According to Miyashiro, the results of the operation "demonstrated that the methodology of police operational intelligence was sufficient".
The sixth GEIN operation, which concluded on June 22, 1991, allowed the "neutralization of the apparatus of the Socorro Popular del Per party", a front organization of the SL. And then. The eleventh operation, "Victoria", which has also been baptized as "The capture of the century", began on September 12, 1992 and led to the capture of Guzman, who was hiding in a two-story house at number 459, 1st Street, Urbanization Los Sauces, in the district of Surquillo. Guzman was captured in this operation.
"Cheeky" is elusive
Finding Guzman had proved to be a very challenging task. Enter Abimael. In his article "El camino del terror" of 2021, journalist Umberto Jara explains that comrade Gonzalo "never inhabited a hideout for long and for this he used a logistics composed of faithful women (.) and specifically a former nun of British descent , Nelly Evans Risco, in charge of the finances and rent of the properties without raising any red flags due to her monastic status and the fact that she signed the contracts with an English passport.
Add to this information that all the police had on Guzman was an old photo from 1979. Since the terrorist leader can be seen dancing to "Zorba, the Greek" on some of the tapes police discovered in a Santa Catalina home in Dec. 1991. Guzman constantly orchestrated terror from Lima.
The capital had been plunged into darkness just four days before the capture after SL detonated several high-tension pylons. It was confirmed that there were additional occupants in the guard house, as Miyashiro claims, due to a flash on the second floor.
That Saturday, September 12, 1992, after eight o'clock at night, an elite unit of the anti-subversive police entered the Surquilla house and discovered Guzman Reinoso, "Chairman Gonzalo".The agents 'Squirrel' and 'Seagull', who appeared to be a couple in love and were enjoying a drink in a nearby bar, took advantage of the departure of the dancer's uncle, composer Celso Garrido Lecca, and his partner, Patricia Awapara. They had gone to visit. It was an unforgettable moment, and they forced their way into the house. According to reports, 15 Gein agents participated in this operation, according to Miyashiro.
The words "positive for Cachetón" were heard as Guzman's identity was established. "Bingo, bingo, we got Cachetón!" then said repeatedly over the radio. In that house, the second floor was where it all happened. The police intelligence work had been successful. The Peruvians could rest easy.
Reference: 30 años de la captura del cabecilla de SL, Abimael Guzmán. (s. f.). Noticias | Diario Oficial El Peruano. https://www.elperuano.pe/noticia/190581-30-anos-de-la-captura-del-cabecilla-de-sl-abimael-guzman
Chavín de Huantar's Military Operation
This military operation unfolded against the backdrop of a prolonged crisis that began on December 17, 1996. Members of the MRTA stormed the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru, taking 72 hostages captive. The militants demanded the release of their comrades and the fulfillment of various political demands. As negotiations with the MRTA proved unsuccessful and concerns for the hostages' well-being escalated, President Alberto Fujimori authorized the use of force to rescue the captives.
The operation had a meticulous planning and precise execution. The Peruvian armed forces established a crisis management team and engaged in intelligence gathering to gather critical information about the embassy layout, hostage locations, and the militants' capabilities. They constructed a network of underground tunnels that would provide the element of surprise and ensure the safety of the hostages during the operation. The Girasoles (Sunflowers) were an assault team, a specialized unit within the Peruvian Special Forces, played a pivotal role in the operation. Their training, expertise in close-quarters combat, and ability to adapt to unexpected circumstances were critical in executing the mission successfully. Additionally, the operation involved a diversionary tactic, wherein negotiators disguised as embassy staff engaged the hostage-takers, providing a distraction while the main assault force infiltrated the building.
The Chavin de Huantar operation exemplified the bravery, resilience, and professionalism of the Peruvian armed forces. The Girasoles assault team displayed exceptional courage as they confronted heavily armed militants and skillfully neutralized them while ensuring the safety of the hostages. The success of the operation can be attributed to their exemplary training, discipline, and unwavering commitment to the mission's objectives, but the operation was not without sacrifices. One hostage lost his life during the rescue operation, and several members of the Peruvian forces sustained injuries. Despite these challenges, the operation succeeded in freeing the remaining hostages and restoring a sense of security and hope to the nation.
The Chavin de Huantar military operation left an indelible mark on Peru's national security landscape. It served as a resounding message to terrorists and militant groups that Peru was prepared to defend its citizens and protect its sovereignty. The successful operation bolstered the nation's confidence in its armed forces, fostering a spirit of unity and resilience. Furthermore, Chavin de Huantar highlighted the significance of intelligence gathering, meticulous planning, and coordinated execution in crisis management. The operation became a case study for military institutions worldwide, emphasizing the value of preparedness, adaptability, and decisive action in hostage rescue scenarios.
The Chavin de Huantar military operation stands as a testament to the Peruvian armed forces' dedication, bravery, and unwavering commitment to protecting their citizens. It serves as a shining example of successful crisis management, leaving an enduring legacy of national unity, resilience, and the pursuit of peace and security.